BM: Adjust the incentive model to optimize EOS governance issues

BM announced the EOS blockchain governance proposal in Medium this morning, hoping to improve the EOS network voting problem by adjusting the incentive model. To ensure long-term prospects and user engagement, only those who have long-term pledge tokens are eligible to vote. The gains a person receives from holding a token make up for the loss of liquidity, and the gain should be proportional to the time the token is locked. For the network, the longer the token is pledged, the better, based on the market-determined interest rate.
BM recommends creating six pledge pools of different lengths: 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years. In a network with a token supply of 1 billion, each pool is 5 million per year, released on a minute-by-minute basis (assuming the network is running at 100% reliability). The user can put the token into the pledge pool to obtain a prorated pooled revenue. The user's voting weight is based on the sum of his percentage of ownership in each pledge pool. This means that 3% of inflation per year will be paid to different pledge pools.