Can incentive model adjustment improve EOS online voting? BM release new ideas for governance

Summary: A new token pledge model.

Yesterday morning, EOS founder BM released the EOS blockchain governance proposal, hoping to improve the EOS network voting problem by adjusting the incentive model.

In this proposal, BM separates different types of pledge pools and adopts certain incentives and restrictions to separate pledge users for different purposes. These include: rate of return, voting rights, the user's token owned by the exchange, and the minimum and maximum maturity of the pledge. The result is a more equitable mortgage system. It believes that the market will find a true market-based interest rate and yield curve.

The following is the original BM:

The purpose of blockchain governance is to make decisions that best serve the interests of as many people as possible, while minimizing the chance that a small group of people will profit for themselves at the expense of community interests. The key is that if the network is not able to fully realize its potential, it is necessary to coordinate the interests of all parties and choose the party with the greatest loss. True stakes prove that long-term interests are linked and control is given to those with long-term commitments.

From an objective point of view, we can conservatively assume that all accounts that vote for producers belong to producers. We can also think of voting and "buying votes" as "rental shares" in order to enter the top N. Since there is little difference between leasing and selling under a trustless repurchase agreement, there is nothing unethical about this behavior, and trying to prevent it is actually a potential violation of ownership .

In order to ensure long-term prospects and “interests”, only tokens that have signed a long-term bet are eligible to vote. The gains a person receives from holding a token make up for the loss of liquidity and should be proportional to the time the token is locked. For the network, the longer the Token is locked, the better, based on the market-determined interest rate.


Therefore, I propose to create 6 pledge pools of different lengths: 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years. In a network with a Token supply of 1 billion, each pool will receive 500 tokens per minute per year (assuming the network is running at 100% reliability). Users can purchase the pool to get a prorated pool revenue. The user's voting weight is based on the sum of their ownership percentages for each pool. This represents an annual 3% inflation payment to different betting pools.

Funds can be taken from the pool, up to one per week. A three-month fund pool may be withdrawn at a rate of about 7% per week. A 10-year fund pool may be withdrawn at a rate of 0.2% per week.

The Token in the pledge pool is taken from the "resources" pool and therefore cannot be lent to REX, which increases the bandwidth of each Token for all Tokens in REX. The bet pool can be viewed as a bond, and the currency will be out of circulation and will receive additional interest due to inflation at some point in the future, thus re-entering circulation.

As long as your tokens are still in a bet pool, they will receive a compound interest proportional to the total amount of each bet pool.

Token can move from a shorter period to a longer period without delay. So you can convert 100% of your 3-month shares into 10-year shares at any time. However, you cannot move from 10-year bonds to shorter-term bonds unless you are at a rate of 0.2% per week.

As a result of this beating system, market forces will set yield curves based on balancing power and liquidity needs . Few people are willing to give up 10 years of liquidity in order to obtain higher relative returns and greater network power. More people will be willing to give up three months of liquidity, so they will get lower yields and less power.

Once everyone has marked and voted, the 21 block producers will be selected based on "one mark a vote" (weighted according to the percentage of the mark pool). These producers will be paid in proportion to the votes they receive, rather than on a per block basis. Be aware that in addition to being linear with their votes, paying any fees to block producers will spur sybil attacks and lead to an increase in the concentration of power.

Producers' compensation should be reduced to only 0.5% of the token supply each year (subject to global reliability) . Because basically the biggest stakeholders may control the producer. Therefore, the proceeds paid to these bet pools are likely to flow into the hands of most of the same producers.

If the network does not ensure reliable generation of blocks, then all the decentralization in the world will not help anyone. Therefore, all inflation rates are calculated on a 7-day average and usability is increased to a power of 10 . At 99% reliability, the total inflation rate will reach 90% and the maximum inflation rate will be 3.5%. If a producer begins to lose blocks and reliability drops to 97%, then everyone's output drops to 73% of the maximum output. This means that if voters (ticketers) do not vote for reliable producers, they will be punished.

Expected result

Exchanges will not be able to vote with user tokens because most of the control is tied to long-term betting contracts. A symbolic one-vote model and a proportionally paid vote, it will end the case where the two producers are operated by one person. Only the marked tokens vote, we guarantee that everyone who wants to be a producer can participate, even the lowest producer location is likely to be reliable. Perhaps one of the more fascinating results is the discovery of a truly market-based interest rate and yield curve. Smaller stakeholders can gain additional impact and higher returns by participating in long-term betting pools.

REX will define the bet pool yield for the shortest term (3 days) and the token in REX will no longer have voting rights. Those who seek income should turn to the bet pool.

Everything in this proposal is for the community to consider and may be one of many possible solutions.

Author: Daniel Larimer

Compile: Sharing Finance Neo

Original title: "BM new work: new ideas for blockchain governance model"