Cdot Network founder Liu Yi
Good afternoon everyone, the topic I am discussing today is "From Web2.0 to Web3.0". What is Web3.0? The Internet is currently at the Web 2.0 stage. Web 3.0 is the design and vision of the next generation of the Internet. Fifteen years ago, Sir Tim Bernard-Lee, the inventor of the Web, believed that the current limitation of the Internet is that HTML is for people to see, without metadata, and cannot be understood by machines. Therefore, the data should be given meaning, and smarter and more automated Internet applications should be developed to realize Web 3.0, namely Semantic Web. But about 5 years ago, Sir Lee's vision of the next generation of the Internet changed, and he launched the Internet Magna Carta Campaign, calling on users and practitioners to discuss the future of the Internet extensively.
- What is Web 3.0?
- Web 3.0 does not require a blockchain
- Oasis of Water Drops, Weibo Web 3.0
- From Web2 to Web3: What technical improvements are needed?
- How does the blockchain drive the decentralized network and count those blockchain projects that fit into Web 3.0?
- The technical path of WEB3: from economic logic to the development of blockchain technology architecture
Dr. Gavin Wood proposed a revolutionary Web 3.0 vision in 2014, and subsequently launched the Web3 Foundation. His philosophy is: Web3 is a broad set of movements and protocols launched to make the Internet more decentralized, verifiable, and secure; Web3's vision is to achieve a serverless, decentralized Internet, where users have their own identity and data And the Internet of fate; Web3 will launch a new global digital economic system, create new business models and new markets, break the monopoly of the platform, and promote extensive, bottom-up innovation.
No matter what kind of Web 3.0, the starting point is that the current Internet Web 2.0 is imperfect and flawed. And Web2.0's problems are not small, minor repairs and small patches cannot be solved, and need to be updated. Therefore, for the analysis and understanding of Web3.0, we must start from understanding the deficiencies of Web2.0. Before starting the analysis, I hope that everyone will think about a question: why on the one hand the advocates of Web3.0 proposed that the Internet is broken! On the other hand, billions of Internet users around the world enjoy the full range of Web2.0 Service, know little or indifferent to Web3.0. Is Web3.0 a wake-up call or an alarmist?
The modern socio-economic system is a huge network where every enterprise or individual accesses, participates in providing certain products or services, and purchases and consumes more types of products and services at the same time. The invisible hand (market mechanism) works efficiently at the edge of the network. Producers continue to innovate in order to increase profits and respond to competition, and continuously improve production efficiency. Consumers look for quality and cheap products and services, and strive to achieve utility within the scope of ability to pay maximize. The middle part of the network is a complex transaction / exchange link, where the "invisible hand" does not always work effectively. Asymmetric information can increase transaction costs and even prevent transactions from occurring. At the same time, the existence of asymmetric information has created a demand for information intermediaries.
The business model of Web2.0 Internet companies is to use Internet technology to efficiently and large-scale eliminate information asymmetry and reduce transaction costs, thereby replacing traditional intermediaries and creating new intermediary models. The winner of the 2014 Nobel Prize in Economics, Jean Tirole of France published a paper "Platform Competition in Bilateral Markets" in 2003, which systematically explained the value positioning and business strategy of the platform in bilateral markets. Since then, organizations that trigger interactions between two or more user groups to create value have been referred to as bilateral platforms or multilateral platforms, or platforms for short. In 2016, two American scholars published "Platform Revolution: Business Models That Change the World", which clearly showed that the essence of Web2.0 is the platform economy, and declared that the platform is eating the entire world.
that's the truth. In 2018, the world's listed companies ranked in the top 10 in terms of market capitalization, and platform companies occupied 8 seats. The top 10 most profitable companies in the world in 2019, and platform companies also occupy 8 seats. The 10 most profitable listed companies in China in 2018, including 6 banks (ICBC / CCB / ABC / BOC / Transport / China Merchants), 1 insurance company (Ping An), 1 telecommunications operator (mobile), and 2 Internet companies (Tencent / Ali), all are platform enterprises. The profits of 10 companies accounted for nearly 40% of the 500 largest listed companies. In addition, unicorn companies that are highly sought after in the capital market are almost always platforms. More than half of the total profits of Chinese A-share listed companies were created by dozens of bank-listed companies, and this situation has lasted for 10 years.
The platform has obtained most of the economic value added, and the whole society is working for the platform. Is this normal? Could it be said that in the past two decades, only the platforms of all Chinese companies in the world have improved their labor productivity? The platform business has a network effect, that is, the more users, the better the service. Therefore, when the scale of the platform reaches a certain level, a de facto monopoly will be formed, and it will be difficult for new or similar enterprises of the same type to compete with it. Take taxi as an example. After Didi merged with Kuaidi, it has almost all the drivers and passengers of online taxis. Other taxi-hailing websites are difficult to develop, and it is very difficult for drivers and passengers to get away from Didi. Didi's core mission is to make money for the company's shareholders, so it will take advantage of its monopoly position to raise car fares as much as possible, and reduce the driver's share to maximize profits. This is a rent-seeking behavior, that is, an activity that does not contribute to production and uses its special status to expand its share of income distribution. Compared with 3 years ago, Didi's contribution to the ride-hailing process has not changed, but due to the monopoly of the market due to the increase in scale, Didi has turned subsidies into royalties. It is precisely because of the monopoly platform's continuous rent-seeking that the proportion of income distribution obtained is getting larger and larger.
The way Internet companies monopolize the market is to have a lot of data about service providers and service users. Is mastering data the original sin of the Web2.0 platform? Should the platform pay users for using their data? Some Web 3.0 startup projects start with protecting personal privacy. So what exactly is privacy? Is privacy just about human rights and dignity, or is it economically significant? Is the personal data storage project successful? This article attempts to use economic methods to analyze transactions, information, and platforms, hoping to inspire answers to this series of questions.
The platform is to create value by promoting transactions / interactions between different user groups. This article only focuses on trading platforms and does not discuss social networking, instant messaging, content communities and other platforms that promote interaction as the core value orientation. The core of the trading platform is to eliminate information asymmetry and reduce transaction costs. To understand the trading platform, we must first understand the asymmetry of information.
It can be said that since the transaction, the buyer and the seller have been in an asymmetric state of information. Let ’s first look at what information buyers and sellers have. For example, when you go to work in the company, the time is a little tight, and you decide to take a taxi, which is the demand. Then at this time and here, express trains, taxis, and special cars traveling within a certain range of the surrounding area are all supplied. Or if you do n’t want to cook at night and you do n’t want to go out to eat, you decide to order takeaway. If you take takeaway, you need it. The restaurants in the same city that provide takeaway are supply. Preference is the individual needs of buyers. Takeaway as an example. Preference includes grade, taste, timeliness requirements, whether to value coupons, etc. The quality we are talking about here is not the quality in the narrow sense, but the broad sense, which is the ability of the goods or services provided by the seller to meet the needs of the buyer. Utility is the profit that buyers get after receiving goods or services. Utility is quantifiable, but often subjective and ambiguous. For example, if you order a takeaway for 30 yuan and you think it is worth after eating, you can think that the obtained utility is more than 30 yuan. Conversely, if you think it's not worth it, the effect of this meal on you is likely to be less than 30 yuan. Sometimes the utility that buyers get can be accurately quantified. For example, someone buys an item for 50 yuan, and then sells it for 80 yuan. If he has determined that he can sell at a premium before completing the buy transaction, then the utility obtained by the buy transaction is the difference, which is 30 yuan. Cost is very easy to understand, that is, the value that the seller has already invested in providing goods or services. In the state of complete information asymmetry, demand, preferences, and utility are exclusive information for buyers, and supply, quality, and cost are exclusive information for sellers.
The following uses an example of a simple transaction without an intermediary to illustrate the exchange of information during the transaction. A farmer went to the bazaar to buy steamed buns. There were some stalls selling farm tools in the bazaar. The stall owners put out the hoe to sell, which is to disclose the supply information. Farmers selected at the stalls and also disclosed their own demand information. At this time, the stall owner will make a recommendation to the farmer, saying that his hoe has any advantages, etc. This is the seller's public quality information. If the farmer cannot identify the authenticity of the quality information, there are three possibilities: First, the farmer cannot determine whether the utility obtained by the transaction is positive, that is, or not, and therefore decides to abandon the trade; second, the farmer decides to bear the risk of being cheated (that is, the utility (For negative risk) to complete the transaction; third, the farmer invited a knowledgeable friend to help select, that is, to hire an intermediary. These three options also show that information asymmetry constitutes transaction friction and increases transaction costs. In this example, the exchange of information is limited to the transaction. The actual situation is of course much more complicated. For example, the farmer may have learned the quality information of which farm is good and which is poor before the market. For the sake of simplicity, suppose the farmer himself is an agricultural implement expert and has the ability to identify quality, which means that the buyer has obtained authentic and reliable quality information. After many selections, the farmer found a satisfactory steamed bun, the length and weight were very suitable, and began to discuss the price with the stall owner. At this time, although the stall owner does not know the farmers' preference information, he can also determine that the goods are suitable. Of course, farmers often pretend that they don't like the hoe so much to hide their preferences.
In the case of supply and demand matching and quality meeting preferences, the condition for the transaction is that the price is lower than the utility and higher than the cost. If the farmer's psychological price is 200 yuan, this is his estimate of the effectiveness of the steamed bun. On the other hand, the comprehensive cost of producing and selling steamed buns is 100 yuan. So in theory, as long as the price is set between 100 yuan and 200 yuan, both parties can get a profit and the transaction can be reached. The transaction price depends on the game between the two parties. If the farmer knows that the cost of a steamed bun is 100 yuan, his optimal strategy is to bid 101 yuan, and then insist that he does not increase the price. If you do not consider the impact of this transaction on other transactions, the seller can only accept the price of 101 yuan, after all, there is always a little profit. Conversely, if the stall owner knows that the farmer's psychological price is 200 yuan, he can make the price reach 199 yuan, and then refuses to lower the price again to obtain the maximum profit. It can be seen that the buyer should keep the utility information confidential, and the seller should keep the cost information confidential, so as to avoid being disadvantaged in the negotiation.
Take an extreme example of the disclosure of utility information: When you take a taxi to work in the company in the morning, the utility you get is determined by a variety of factors and is constantly changing. These factors include: whether your company has a strict attendance system The number of times you have been late for the month, the opinions of your superiors and colleagues about being late, whether there are important meetings or appointments on the day, and so on. Of course, taxis may be used to catch planes, or to go to the hospital for medical treatment, and the effectiveness varies. Only you can fully understand the above information, and only you can estimate the effectiveness of the taxi. Suppose that the online car service provider exchanges data with the company's OA SaaS service provider, knowing that you have been late twice this month, and you will be deducted from your salary after being late again, so I will only give you the option of a special car, and you must increase the price Terrible thing. It can be seen that once the utility information is grasped by the service party, the user will be in a disadvantageous position of "man-made knife and I am fish" in the transaction.
On the other hand, cost information is related to production methods and techniques. Producers of products or service providers invest in technology, methods, knowledge, and skills in order to minimize costs under certain quality standards. If the producer's cost information is fully exposed, no matter how he improves his technology, he will not be able to obtain more profits, and he will not have the motivation (and ability) to make reinvestment inputs.
Therefore, information asymmetry does not always increase transaction costs. To eliminate information asymmetry, it is necessary to distinguish information types. Preferences, utilities and costs are private information and should not be exposed during the transaction. So beyond human rights and dignity, privacy has economic significance. Some people say: I do things with integrity, and there is nothing I can't let people know, so I don't need privacy. The implication is that privacy is a concern only when bad things have been done. From the above analysis, we know that this is a wrong view.
Knowing the information asymmetry in the transaction process, you can deduce how good trading platforms should work, and you can know that the practices of those platforms are bad. The good and bad mentioned in this article are not moral considerations, but economic considerations based on the overall interests of society. There are two principles: The first is the principle of efficiency, which means that resources are given to the person or organization that can use them as effectively as possible, which is to strive for the so-called Pareto optimality. The second principle is fairness, try to make the distribution of wealth more even, and avoid serious polarization between the rich and the poor.
Let's look at an example of a farmer buying a bun. In this case, the utility is 100 yuan higher than the cost, which means that as long as a transaction is concluded, the society as a whole will gain an economic value of 100 yuan. And in this case, regardless of the outcome of the bargaining, it does not violate the principles of efficiency and fairness. If the price is good, farmers can use the money saved to buy fertilizer or use it for consumption. If the price is not well negotiated, and the stall owner has made more money, he can increase the input for reproduction or improve his living standard. Neither side has the special ability to ensure that each transaction has an advantage. This is the balance. If a farm tool distribution giant appears, promise low prices. All farmers no longer go to the market, but go to the dealers to buy steamed buns. Farm tools workshops are unable to compete and can only supply to dealers, and the supply price is kept to a minimum. The monopoly distribution model has a network effect, and the dealer giant can gradually control the agricultural tool operation in the province and the country, just like Wal-Mart did in the daily necessities market. So is this trading pattern good? For the farmer, he got consistent low prices without paying the bargaining costs. However, a considerable part of the proceeds of the transaction was earned by the dealer. When dealers monopolize the market, more profits will no longer improve efficiency. Suppliers continue to be suppressed because of prices, reducing investment in improving production. As we all know, the Walton family behind Wal-Mart is the richest family in the world, with a wealth of 190 billion US dollars, which is tens of thousands of times that of ordinary American families. Overall, the rich-poor divide in the United States has become very serious, and it continues to worsen. Historical experience shows that extreme polarization between the rich and the poor usually triggers a revolution and the social structure will be overthrown.
Through the above analysis, the role that the platform should play in trading can be introduced: as an intermediary, not as an intermediary. Once the platform becomes a middleman, the business goal becomes to create the largest possible spread. With scale (derived from network effects) and information advantages, the platform can squeeze to both sides to obtain more and more economic value added. Many traditional platforms use the middleman model, such as retail giants, commercial banks, insurance companies, and so on. There are also some Internet platforms that are middlemen, the most typical of which are travel services, air tickets, hotels, taxis, and tourism.
As for demand and supply information, Good Platform will fully disclose supply and demand information and provide matching services. For example, for e-commerce websites, all users can browse and search for all product information, which meets the standards of a good platform. The opposite example is searching for the name of a company on Baidu. If this company did not pay Baidu, the company's official website would not be included in the search results. And the ones listed first are usually some suspicious links. This is a typical bad platform performance, not only intentionally hiding the information with the highest value to users, but also using algorithms to build trading traps.
The use and screening of preference and quality information is the biggest application direction of big data and artificial intelligence. The good platform will truly and comprehensively disclose quality information, and help buyers screen quality information through evaluation systems and intelligent technologies. With the buyer's permission, use preference information to provide buyers with recommendation services. In addition, using preference information to provide statistical forecasting services for sellers will be a big market in the future, and big data and artificial intelligence will have great potential. For example, you may often see that certain restaurants are repeatedly rented out, and today they make high-end Japanese food. They can no longer make it in a few months, and they have changed to civilian Sichuan cuisine. Such repeated experiments are actually a process of allocating production resources. Information technology can be used to improve the efficiency of allocation. For example, the consumption data (essentially buyer preference information) reviewed by Meituan is used to predict the operation of a restaurant of this type at this location, which will improve the success rate of restaurant operations and better meet the consumer needs of surrounding users. To provide such services using the user's preference data, the platform needs explicit permission from the user (that is, the user does not agree by default). In order to obtain user permission, the platform will naturally provide incentives such as coupons and points.
There is now a type of Web3 startup project that advocates that users' private data should be kept by themselves. I don't think it's economically valid for users to save their own data in terms of preference data alone. The first reason is that the platform stores the data in order to utilize the preference data without charging users. If users save their own data, they generally need to pay to cloud storage service providers. From free to paid, with the exception of very few people who are particularly concerned about privacy, they will not be accepted by the general public. The second reason is that the big data stored centrally is a treasure house. The data stored in the partition is difficult to be used by data mining and artificial intelligence, which is equivalent to destroying its value. To destroy value on the grounds of unfair distribution, not progress is retrogression, as is the Lutheran movement that destroyed machines in the early days of the industrial revolution.
The evil of the platform is most obviously reflected in the attitude to false quality information. In order to gain benefits, bad platforms acquiesce or even condone false quality information. For example, Baidu's medical advertising, Baidu believes that they are only responsible for checking whether the advertiser has medical qualifications, and has no ability or responsibility to check the authenticity of the information. However, medical care is originally a field of serious information asymmetry. Baidu's bidding ranking objectively provides a mechanism for the reverse selection of quality information. This completely violates the principles of efficiency and fairness. If Baidu is a responsible company, since it recognizes that it cannot help consumers identify and screen quality information, it should completely ban medical advertising.
Finally, seller costs and buyer utility are the basis for their equal participation in transactions. Platforms should not use data and algorithms to estimate buyer utility and seller costs. As an information intermediary, sellers' pricing power should be respected. At the same time, buyers should be treated equally, and the knowledge of buyers should not be used to engage in price discrimination, that is, to engage in so-called big data to kill off.
I believe most people agree that the Internet platforms are getting worse. This has nothing to do with the prevailing world trend and the lack of popular support. It is the result of free market competition. From the above analysis, we can see that at each level, bad platforms have stronger capabilities and greater space to obtain profits than good platforms. The Web 2.0 platform and traditional platforms are both enterprises. For a long time, there has been a game involving the interests of the users, employees, and shareholders of the company, but maximizing the interests of shareholders has been recognized as the bounden duty of the company. So it's no surprise that the vast majority of companies are in the limelight. As a monopoly platform company, Alibaba regards "users first, employees second, shareholders third" as the first value, which is a great initiative. However, in the current business environment, whether it can be truly achieved and persisted for a long time remains to be confirmed in the future.
The worst case of Web2.0 is the continuous integration of the Internet platform to form a omnipotent monopoly platform. It understands all the information of all buyers and sellers and plunders the economic value of all transactions. Such a horrible future is unlikely, first of all because of industry regulation. According to the analysis of the previous good and bad platforms, some regulatory rules for trading platform companies can be easily pushed out, including: prohibiting the platform from being an intermediary; must fully disclose supply and demand information; false quality information platforms bear joint and several liability; recommended services Explicit subscriptions; Prohibition of cross-service use of data; Prohibition of price discrimination; Users can export and clear all personal data, etc. It is not difficult to determine the regulatory rules for the Web 2.0 platform. However, the reality is that platform giants have not been well regulated, and abuse of monopoly advantages and improper profits have become the norm.
Why does the supervision of the Web2.0 platform fail? The author of Platform Revolution believes that the main factor hindering the effectiveness of regulation is the issue of "regulatory captives", that is, the objects being regulated affect the regulators in a way that is beneficial to them. This is not the main cause of regulatory failure. In the 1980s, the United States split the telecommunications giant AT & T in accordance with antitrust laws. In the 1990s, the debate over whether to split the operating system giant Microsoft Corporation was very uproar. But in the last ten years, although FAANG has formed a de facto monopoly, few people talk about splitting the Internet giant. The reason is not that the Internet giants have a stronger ability to lobby, or that the current regulators are more corrupt, but that the Internet platform is already a strategic force of the national economy, and the competition between platforms is a game between big powers. Similar to the global economic pattern, the Internet is the leading role of companies in the United States and China. The top 20 global Internet companies in the market in 2018 were taken over by Chinese and American companies. The rise of Internet companies is also the most important economic achievement that China has achieved in the new century. In this context, it is easy to understand the dilemma of Web2.0 platform supervision: whether it will lead to increased monopoly, affect efficiency and social equity. Guan is also worried about affecting business operations and weakening the country's economic competitiveness. One of the most important reasons for the introduction of GPDR, the strictest data use regulation in Europe, is that there are no Internet giants in Europe. Europeans rely heavily on US Internet service providers and suffer from monopoly platforms. In recent years, the European Union and EU countries have imposed fines on Google totaling more than 10 billion euros. But fines alone cannot obviously bridge the gap between monopolistic companies and start-ups.
As a result of free market competition, the Internet was monopolized by bad platforms, and supervision was unable to curb the evils of the platform. The heavy responsibility of history fell on the shoulders of Web 3.0. The core of Web3.0 is a new form of platform. It is a set of cryptographically guaranteed transaction rules, called encryption protocols. Based on the encryption protocol, direct transactions / interactions between user groups can jointly create value and network effects. Unlike existing platforms, encryption protocols are not operated by enterprises, but are maintained and operated by a community of many independent entities. The nature of cryptographic protocols that are not controlled by a single entity or a coalition of minority entities is decentralization.
The decentralized encryption protocol has a built-in incentive mechanism to distribute encrypted tokens to participants according to rules. The more participants contribute to the growth of the platform, the more tokens they will receive. With the growth of the platform economy, the value of the token will create value and share the benefits of the participants. It can be seen that the decentralized encryption protocol is a revolution in the organization and distribution of the platform, and it has reduced the dimensionality of traditional platforms. Although encryption protocols have essential advantages, like all new technologies, they face problems such as immature technology, high cost, poor user experience, and low user acceptance. The early entrepreneurial opportunities of Web3.0 should not be a positive PK with Web2.0, but should choose the areas where Web2.0 has not achieved great success. In addition, Web 3.0 is not an independent system that develops in parallel with Web 2.0. The collaboration between the decentralized encryption protocol and the centralized platform can give play to their respective advantages, create new use scenarios, and achieve integrated development. Web3.0 is expected to be the first to be applied in the fields of finance, energy, labor market, government, and Internet of Things.
As with traditional platforms, cryptographic protocols may also be dominant in specific markets. Once the group that benefits from the high intermediary fee controls the encryption protocol governance right, the governance decision-making direction will be to continuously increase the intermediary fee, that is, rent-seeking. However, the rent-seeking of cryptographic protocols is limited by the forkability of the blockchain. When the encryption protocol acts as a middleman to extract too much revenue, it will create arbitrage space for the fork. The fork chain inherits all the data of the original chain, reduces fees and attracts participants who benefit from low intermediary fees, competes with the original chain, and even replaces the original chain. In addition to suppressing rent-seeking, bifurcation also keeps encryption protocols in competition. Once a cryptographic protocol stagnates, the fork chain can use more efficient trading rules and fairer incentives to compete for participants in the original chain. It can be seen that the encryption protocol solves the platform monopoly problem at the basic level.
"Technical Revolution and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of the Bubble and the Golden Age" summarizes the economic development of the past 200 years into five cycles, each of which is driven by the technological revolution and lasts about 50 years. Each round of technological revolution involves the deep participation of financial capital and has profoundly shaped the socio-economic system. From the early 1970s, the era of information and telecommunications marked by the advent of Intel microprocessors has been going on for 50 years. Human society is at the starting point of the next era of technological revolution. If the encryption protocol is the protagonist of the next technological revolution, not only will financial capital be deeply involved as before, but its own operating mechanism will also face major changes.
The following quote is from "Technical Revolution and Financial Capital": "… Each technological revolution is accepted as a shock by society. It encounters strong resistance from people and institutions during the proliferation process. Therefore, technological revolution The full development of creative potential will always have quite chaotic and contradictory social consequences at the beginning, after which a major social restructuring is required. This includes not only changing the regulatory framework that affects all markets and economic activities, and redesigning it into a whole series of institutions ——Including government, financial regulation and education, and including the revision of social behavior and ideas. It is precisely because of reshaping the environment that is compatible with the potential of the technological revolution that the "golden age" has emerged. "
Perhaps it is most appropriate to quote Marx's insights here: productivity determines production relations. The new productive forces created by each round of technological revolution will conflict with the system and supervision at that time, and it will go through a process from fracture to recoupling. Our luck lies in the fact that policy makers already know this well and will not use the current system to force new productive forces to be restrained, but to give innovation a certain development space and allow a certain degree of chaos. But no matter which country's regulators have two bottom lines: one is tolerate innovation, but not tolerate scams. Second, it must not endanger financial stability and social stability.
Some researchers have called on entrepreneurs of the blockchain (blockchain is the core technology for implementing Web 3.0) to pay attention to compliance and embrace supervision. I do not fully agree with this. You know, Web3.0 entrepreneurs are the explorers of the latest productivity, and they are facing the awkward situation of being out of compliance. In my opinion, Web3.0 entrepreneurship must conform to the rules of the future. When the encryption protocol is implemented on a large scale, its advantages and limitations have already appeared. It is believed that regulators will be able to formulate rules that are compatible with it. Future regulatory rules will embrace Web 3.0 projects that can improve production resource allocation efficiency, reduce transaction costs, promote the development of the real economy, and promote social equity.
At the moment when entrepreneurs and regulators are exploring, Web 3.0 entrepreneurs don't have to worry about compliance, but should return to more fundamental issues. First of all, Web 3.0 is a real innovation. If the encryption protocol cannot improve efficiency, reduce costs, and promote fairness, it can only be a scam. The second is that no matter where the funding comes from, entrepreneurial projects are social resources. Entrepreneurs have a responsibility to use funds for technological innovation. If the encryption protocol is successfully implemented, the entrepreneurs and other participants in the community share the benefits. If the agreement is unsuccessful, as long as the entrepreneurs do not squander the funds and do not have enough money, it is the reasonable price that society has paid for innovation. In addition, conditional Web 3.0 entrepreneurship projects should strengthen communication with regulators, and both parties understand and learn from each other to jointly explore the development path of Web 3.0.
The above is my share, thank you all!